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Abstract 
Nonhuman animals show evidence for three types of concept learning: perceptual or similarity-
based in which objects/stimuli are categorized based on physical similarity; relational in which 
one object/stimulus is categorized relative to another (e.g., same/different); and associative in 
which arbitrary stimuli become interchangeable with one another by virtue of a common 
association with another stimulus, outcome, or response. In this article, we focus on various 
methods for establishing associative concepts in nonhuman animals and evaluate data 
documenting the development of associative classes of stimuli. We also examine the nature of 
the common within-class representation of samples that have been associated with the same 
reinforced comparison response (i.e., many-to-one matching) by describing manipulations for 
distinguishing possible representations. Associative concepts provide one foundation for human 
language such that spoken and written words and the objects they represent become members of 
a class of interchangeable stimuli. The mechanisms of associative concept learning and the 
behavioral flexibility it allows, however, are also evident in the adaptive behaviors of animals 
lacking language. 
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Associative Concept Learning in Animals 
 Evolution has prepared animals to survive and to reproduce in predictable environments 
by predisposing them to perform particular behaviors in specific contexts. Birds are equipped to 
build nests and to tend eggs, and cats are prepared to find a mate and to care for their young. 
Nevertheless, such predisposed behaviors are often insufficient to ensure survival. Learning 
about the predictive relations between events and about the consequences of behavior each give 
animals additional, indispensable means to adapt to and survive in complex and ever-changing 
environments. Primary stimulus generalization (Hull, 1943; see also Honig & Urcuioli, 1981) 
expands these adaptive processes by allowing animals to respond similarly and appropriately to 
new events that resemble past events. Yet, even these processes may not be sufficiently broad to 
permit animals to benefit maximally from past experience. Adaptation and survival can be 
enhanced still further by categorizing diverse experiences on the basis of “similar meaning” – 
i.e., on the basis of common associations (e.g., Schusterman, Reichmuth, & Kastak, 2000). 
 In this paper, we will explore the mechanisms and functions of behavior that arise, not 
from physical resemblance (as in the case of primary stimulus generalization), but from 
associations with common experiences (what Hull, 1939, 1943 called secondary stimulus 
generalization). Our review will underscore the variety of those experiences that can generate 
associatively equivalent stimuli. It will also adopt a “common representation” perspective for 
some of the phenomena we describe, in order to illustrate how this perspective has guided 
systematic research into their controlling variables. 
 Early on, Miller and Dollard (1941) recognized how categorizing diverse experiences 
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contributes to adaptation: 
It is sometimes desirable … to be able to learn to generalize from one situation to another 
despite the fact that these situations have no external cues in common. For example, the 
various enemies surrounding a tribe may not be distinguished by any single physical cue 
in common; that is, an enemy may be just as similar to members of the tribe as he is to 
other enemies. Nevertheless, it may be desirable … to learn to generalize a given 
response, say avoidance, to all enemies. 
Such generalization can be mediated by response-produced cues…. The tribesman 
may learn … to respond to each of a number of people with the same word, “enemy.” … 
This verbal response produces a cue which is common to all these enemies. Once the 
response is learned, the cue which it produces may mediate the transfer of other 
responses. The tribesman may transfer his various responses of retreating, threatening, 
fighting, etc., learned as reactions to one enemy to any other person whom he also calls 
an enemy. (pp. 74-75.) 
Thus, being able to group objects and events into distinct classes – the essence of 
concepts (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950)  allows one to transfer what one has learned about a 
particular object or event to new objects and events (see also Urcuioli, 2013). In a similar vein, 
Murphy (2002) proposed that “Concepts are the glue that holds our mental life together … in that 
they tie our past experiences together to our present interactions with the world, and because the 
concepts themselves are connected to our larger knowledge structures” (Murphy, 2002, p. 1). 
Although human concept learning has been extensively studied (see e.g., Murphy’s 2002 
volume The Big Book of Concepts), comparative analyses of conceptual behavior in humans and 
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other animals has received considerably less attention, at least in some quarters (e.g., The Big 
Book of Concepts has no references to research on animal conceptual behavior). A major 
contributing factor to this oversight is the lack of a common terminology among the major 
research traditions (e.g., see Hampton, 1999) studying the broad topic of concepts, a key notion 
for which there has been no generally accepted definition in psychology (see, for example, 
Chater & Heyes, 1994; Delius, 1994; Huber, 1999; Lea, 1984; Medin & Smith, 1984; Schank, 
Collins, & Hunter, 1986; Thompson, 1995; Wasserman & Bhatt, 1992; Zentall, Galizio, & 
Critchfield, 2002). But, the absence of a broadly accepted definition has not deterred research 
aimed at understanding the variety of ways in which objects and events can be grouped together 
and the benefits that this grouping can convey. Again, Miller and Dollard (1941) used a rather 
compelling historical example to illustrate one possible origin and its benefits: 
According to the traditional story, Newton was started on his application of the principle 
of gravity to celestial mechanics by generalizing a response from a falling apple to the 
moon. An apple and the moon are different in many respects, but are similar in that both 
are bodies possessing mass. Newton presumably responded on the basis of that similarity. 
The response generalized was a verbal one “pulled toward the earth.” (p. 77). 
The most important kinds of concept learning for which there is considerable behavioral 
evidence in nonhuman animals fall into three categories. The first, perceptual or similarity-based 
concept learning, is perhaps the most familiar form in humans; it involves the sorting of stimuli, 
like trees or chairs, that share one or more physical properties into classes. Perceptual similarity 
also guides the responses of nonhuman animals as it does for humans (see e.g., Wasserman & 
Bhatt, 1992; Wasserman, Kiedinger, & Bhatt, 1988), thus demonstrating that this basic kind of 
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conceptual behavior is not unique to people. In both human and nonhuman animals, the 
development of perceptual concepts appears to be largely under the control of the behavioral 
principles of primary stimulus generalization and discrimination (e.g., Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce, 
1988; Wasserman et al., 1988). 
The second, relational concept learning, involves the relationship between (or among) 
objects. One of the most important and interesting examples is sameness/difference, the ability to 
report that one object is either the same as or different from another (Wasserman & Castro, 2012, 
Wright & Katz, 2006). Although we humans have extensive practice with relational concepts and 
they are an integral part of our language, it is clear that under proper conditions, animals too 
demonstrate a considerable ability to use relational concepts (Katz, Wright, & Bachevalier, 2002; 
Wasserman & Young, 2010; Zentall, Edwards, Moore, & Hogan 1981). 
The third, associative concept learning involves the ability to form categories comprising 
arbitrary stimuli that are interchangeable with one other in new contexts (e.g., Dougher & 
Markham, 1994) because of their prior association with each other or with a common event, 
response, or outcome (in humans, e.g., an object and the word for that object). These concepts 
are especially interesting because, as Miller and Dollard (1941) noted, they are not based on any 
particular physical property or inherent relation among the members of the class, but develop 
through experience. In relational frame theory (e.g., Barnes, 1994; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001), they are examples of “arbitrary applicable relational responding,” the adjective 
“arbitrary” indicating that physical resemblance is not required. 
The general nature and formation of categories is also relevant to another tripartite 
organizational scheme in the realm of human conceptual behavior comprising: subordinate 
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concepts, basic-level concepts, and superordinate concepts (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975). This 
familiar scheme proposes that human language concepts can be located at three distinctly 
different levels, depending on the relative extent of intraclass and interclass stimulus similarity. 
A basic-level concept, like chair, enjoys the advantage of high intraclass similarity and low 
interclass similarity. A subordinate concept, like dining chair, is more difficult to establish 
because, relative to a basic-level concept, it entails much higher interclass similarity. A 
superordinate concept, like furniture, is even more difficult to establish because, relative to a 
basic-level concept, it entails much lower intraclass similarity, comprising such strikingly 
different stimuli as chairs, tables, lamps, rugs, and mirrors (see, for example, Lazareva, 
Freiburger, & Wasserman, 2004). Superordinate concepts can clearly be seen to arise from what 
we are terming associative classes or concepts, whereas subordinate and basic-level concepts 
clearly arise from the more primitive perceptual mechanisms of discrimination and primary 
stimulus generalization. 
Our review focuses on associative concept learning, given its long-recognized importance 
in the comparative analyses of human and animal behavior (e.g., Lea, 1984) and because the 
topics of perceptual and relational concept learning have received extensive treatment elsewhere 
(e.g., Herrnstein, 1984, 1985; Katz, Wright & Bodily, 2007; Mackintosh, 1995; Wasserman & 
Astley, 1994; Wright & Katz, 2006). Although we adopt a representational viewpoint in parts of 
our paper, we will not provide a systematic evaluation of the pros and cons of such a perspective 
vis-á-vis others. Instead, our goal is to illustrate the wide-ranging phenomena encompassed by 
associative concept learning and to systematically consider their origins. 
Associative Classes 
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In contrast to perceptual classes (including subordinate and basic-level concepts), which 
share common physical characteristics, the basis for the common response to members of an 
associative class (including superordinate concepts) is altogether arbitrary and must be acquired 
through training (Hall, 1996; Jitsumori, 2004). The very quality of being arbitrary provides 
associative classes with a flexibility that can readily be seen in the extent to which they are used 
in human language (e.g. Hayes et al. 2001). An associative class may consist of an object and its 
various symbolic representations. For example, the object itself, chair, the spoken word “chair,” 
and the written word CHAIR are all members of a common associative class. 
A critical characteristic of an associative class lies in the fact that one member of the 
class can represent the others – i.e., class members are, within limits, interchangeable with one 
another. So, what an individual learns about one member of the class can instantly and 
effectively transfer to other members of the class without any further training. For example, to a 
young child, the word “dog” may represent an animal having the properties ‘friendly,’ ‘wags its 
tail,’ and ‘licks one’s face.’ But, if the child later has an unhappy experience with a dog that 
growls and lunges toward the child in the apparent defense of its territory, then the child may add 
to its representation of dog the attribute ‘may be aggressive.’ If the animal and the word “dog” 
belong to the same associative class, then without further training, the word “dog” may elicit 
some of the same anxiety that has been newly associated with the animal itself (e.g., Dymond et 
al., 2011). 
As another example, consider that children routinely learn to call socks, belts, pants, and 
hats “clothing.” This associative process, which probably proceeds by rote memorization, can be a 
very protracted affair. Yet, when children later learn that “apparel” is a synonym for “clothing,” they 
Associative Concept Learning    9 
 
are instantly able to call socks, belts, pants and hats items of  “apparel,” and do not need to explicitly 
learn that each article is a member of the new category. 
Hull (1939) recognized the importance of such associative classes and proposed 
secondary stimulus generalization as a means of accounting for how classes of disparate 
objects/stimuli could develop. He suggested that explicitly learning the same response to a set of 
disparate stimuli would generate an equivalence among them, so that new behavior trained to a 
subset of the stimulus class would immediately generalize to the remaining, untrained class 
members (see, for example, Lowe, Horne, & Hughes, 2005; Molet, Stagner, Miller, Kasinski, & 
Zentall, 2013; Spradlin, Cotter, & Baxley, 1973; Urcuioli & Lionello-DeNolf, 2001). 
Miller and Dollard (1941) called this process the acquired equivalence of cues to capture 
the idea that, via learning, disparate but “equivalent” cues become members of a common class 
that are now substitutable for one another. The term “emergent relation” broadly refers to the 
ability of a member of such a stimulus class to “… evoke a reaction … with which it has never 
been associated” (Hull, 1939, p. 9; see also Shipley, 1935). Indeed, demonstrating emergent or 
derived relations is the standard way to establish acquired equivalence specifically and 
associative classes more generally (e.g., Astley & Wasserman, 1998, 1999; Lazareva, Freiburger, 
& Wasserman, 2004; Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; Wasserman, DeVolder, & Coppage, 1992; 
Vonk & McDonald, 2004). 
Our review of research into associative concept learning begins with a consideration of 
the differential outcomes effect – a key phenomenon in which otherwise unrelated stimuli are 
bound into functional categories because of their pairing with a common outcome. 
Establishing Associative Classes: The Differential Outcomes Effect 
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In a conditional discrimination, such as matching-to-sample, an initial or sample stimulus 
indicates which of two (or more) comparison stimuli is correct. For example, if the sample is a 
red light, then the vertical line is correct, whereas if the sample is a green light, then the 
horizontal line is correct. In matching-to-sample, when a correct response to each of two 
comparison stimuli is followed by a different outcome (e.g., food following a correct response to 
one comparison, water following a correct response to the other, a so-called differential 
outcomes procedure), acquisition of the task is often faster than a control condition involving 
nondifferential outcomes (Trapold, 1970; see also Alling, Nickel, Poling, 1991; Estévez , 2005; 
Urcuioli, 2005). Furthermore, with differential outcomes, inserting a delay between the offset of 
the sample stimulus and the onset of the comparison stimuli typically results in higher delayed 
matching accuracies than for a nondifferential outcomes condition (Brodigan & Peterson, 1976; 
see also Hochhalter et al., 2000). 
In the animal literature, the differential outcomes effect has been interpreted as evidence 
that outcome expectancies conditioned to the sample stimuli associated with the different 
outcomes acquire cue properties over and above the samples themselves (Overmier & Linwick, 
2001; Peterson, 1984; see also Overmier & Lawry, 1979). More important for the present 
purposes is that different stimuli signaling the same outcome become functionally equivalent. 
For example, Peterson trained pigeons on a conditional discrimination involving 
differential outcomes of food for a correct response following a sample of one color and a tone 
for a correct response following a sample of a different color. On other trials, there was single 
stimulus training in which one shape was followed by food and another shape was followed by 
the tone. When the pigeons were later tested on trials in which the shapes replaced the colors as 
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samples in the conditional discrimination, positive transfer was found relative to control groups 
for which differential outcomes were not associated with both pairs of stimuli. Similarly, 
following training with two identity matching tasks (one involving colors, the other shapes) 
using differential outcomes of two different kinds of grain (e.g., corn following correct responses 
to one color and wheat following correct responses to the other; corn following correct responses 
to one shape and wheat following correct responses to the other), positive transfer was observed 
when the samples from the two tasks were subsequently interchanged (Edwards, Jagielo, Zentall, 
& Hogan, 1982). Moreover, these transfer results closely resembled similar findings observed in 
humans (e.g., Dube et al., 1989; Maki, Overmier, Delos, & Gutman, 1995). 
In behavior analysis, results such as these have been viewed in terms of stimulus class 
formation – viz., stimuli associated with the same reinforcing outcome become members of the 
same class (e.g., Dube et al., 1989; Urcuioli, 2013). In the animal conditioning and cognition 
literatures, however, researchers have asked: “What specific cues mediate these transfer effects?” 
One possibility is differential sample responding arising from the sample-outcome associations, 
given that differential sample responding is known to control comparison choice in other 
paradigms (Urcuioli & Honig, 1980). In fact, Urcuioli and DeMarse (1994) have reported 
evidence that cues produced by differential sample responding was sufficient to mediate transfer 
when samples from a differential-outcomes conditional discrimination are replaced with other 
stimuli associated (off baseline) with differential sample responding, but with nondifferential 
outcomes. 
In most demonstrations of the differential outcomes effect in nonhuman animals, the 
different outcomes have differed in quantitative or qualitative value, for example, 1 versus 5 
Associative Concept Learning    12 
 
pellets of food (Carlson & Wielkiewicz, 1972), 1.0 versus 0.2 probability of a food outcome for a 
correct choice (DeLong & Wasserman, 1981; Kruse & Overmier, 1982), food versus water 
(Honig, Matheson, & Dodd, 1984), or two different kinds of grain (e.g., wheat versus corn; 
Edwards et al., 1982). Such differences may encourage differential sample behavior. 
Yet, even if overtly different sample responding does not develop in a differential 
outcomes task, the fact that the outcomes are likely to differ in their hedonic value (i.e., one is 
typically preferred over the other) may lead to differences in the hedonic values of the samples 
that predict those outcomes. For example, Astley, Peissig, and Wasserman (2001; also see Astley 
& Wasserman, 1998, 1999) found transfer of training between samples associated with one set of 
differential outcomes (1 vs. 5 pellets) and other samples associated with another set of 
differential outcomes (1- vs. 15-s delay of reinforcement). The sole basis for the transfer would 
appear to have been the differential hedonic value of the outcomes (i.e., 5 pellets and a 1-s delay 
of reinforcement would have been relatively “good” outcomes, whereas 1 pellet and a 15-s delay 
of reinforcement would have been relatively “poor” outcomes). 
Similar transfer effects were found by Friedrich and Zentall (2010) using differential 
responding (5 pecks vs. 20 pecks) to one pair of comparison stimuli given one pair of samples 
and different probabilities of reinforcement (0.2 reinforcement vs. 0.8 reinforcement) following 
correct responses to a different pair of comparison stimuli given a different pair of samples. 
Thus, pigeons showed transfer of training when the samples associated with 20 or 5 comparison-
stimulus pecks were now paired, respectively, with comparisons associated with 0.2 and 0.8 
reinforcement and vice versa.  Specifically, the low probability of reinforcement sample was 
interchangeable with the high fixed-ratio sample and the high probability of reinforcement 
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sample was interchangeable with the low fixed-ratio sample (cf. Azrin, 1961; Flora, 1969). 
Astley et al. (2001; also see Astley & Wasserman, 1999) noted that differences in the 
hedonic value of different outcomes affected how pigeons responded to the sample stimuli 
themselves, although the authors reported evidence that their pigeons’ differential response rates 
did not accurately predict their comparison choice behavior. More directly, Frank and 
Wasserman (2005b) found that differential responding (a required low rate of pecking vs. a 
required high rate of pecking) to stimuli associated with similar outcomes did not transfer to 
comparison stimuli that were associated with differential outcomes (1 vs. 9 pellets of food) and 
that supported differential responding to other sample stimuli. 
Zentall and Sherburne (1994) attempted to control for differential sample responding in a 
differential outcomes procedure with pigeons by periodically inserting reinforced presentations 
of the sample to which fewer responses were made. In spite of the fact that sample response rates 
were now effectively equated, a strong differential outcomes effect was nevertheless obtained. 
Thus, it seems more likely that comparison choice was controlled by the anticipation of 
outcomes with different hedonic values than by overtly different sample responding. 
 Equating hedonic value can be accomplished by scheduling different arbitrary cues 
ending in the same reinforcer. To do so, Miller, Friedrich, Narkavic, and Zentall (2009) trained 
pigeons on a matching task in which a blue houselight followed correct responses to one 
comparison stimulus and a tone followed correct responses to the other comparison stimulus 
prior to food presentations. When pigeons were then tested with delays inserted between the 
samples and the comparison stimuli, matching accuracy was significantly higher for the 
differential houselight-outcomes group than for a control group in which the houselights were 
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uncorrelated with the sample stimuli. Thus, samples and correct comparisons paired with 
arbitrary cues preceding a common food outcome facilitate matching performance, suggesting 
the possibility of an associative class involving the sample, the correct comparison stimulus, and 
the arbitrary outcome (see also Fedorchak & Bolles, 1985; Kelly & Grant, 2001). 
Establishing Associative Classes: Many-To-One Mapping 
Transfer of training. Associative classes can be established without differential outcomes 
simply by mapping two or more sample stimuli onto the same reinforced comparison stimulus in 
a conditional discrimination, a procedure called many-to-one (MTO) or comparison-as-node 
matching (Saunders, Saunders, Williams, & Spradlin, 1993; Urcuioli, Zentall, Jackson-Smith, & 
Steirn, 1989; Wasserman et al., 1992). For example, choosing a set of vertical lines by pigeons 
might be reinforced if the sample is either a red light or a set of vertical lines, whereas choosing a 
set of horizontal lines might be reinforced if the sample is either a green light or a set of 
horizontal lines. Although the red and vertical-lines sample are separately paired with the 
vertical-lines comparison, and similarly for the other two samples paired with the horizontal-
lines comparison, their potential membership in a common associative class can be evaluated by 
an independent test. As in the case of the child learning new characteristics of a dog, and then 
demonstrating transfer of such new learning to the word “dog,” we can ask if new comparison 
choices (e.g., choosing between a large circle versus a small dot) acquired by a pigeon for two of 
the original samples (e.g., red and green) would transfer to the two remaining samples (i.e., 
vertical and horizontal lines). The design of this experiment is presented in Table 1 (Urcuioli et 
al., 1989, Experiment 2). 
In fact, most pigeons in this experiment showed evidence of transfer (i.e., of emergent 
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relations between the line-orientation samples from original training and the comparisons from 
interim training, see Figure 1). In other words, most pigeons behaved as though the hue and line 
samples that occasioned the same reinforced comparison choice in MTO matching belonged to 
the same associative class by preferentially selecting the “class-consistent” comparisons on the 
line-sample test trials. The results from experiments with human participants (Delamater & 
Joseph, 2000; Molet et al., 2012; Wasserman & DeVolder, 1993) and from conceptually similar 
experiments with rats (Honey & Hall, 1989) have supported similar conclusions. 
Again, what specific “cue” (cf. Miller & Dollard, 1941) could be the basis of these 
emergent stimulus relations? Urcuioli et al. (1989), working within the animal memory literature, 
suggested that pigeons had commonly represented or “coded” (cf. Lawrence, 1963) samples that 
were associated with the same comparison stimulus. In general terms, MTO training altered the 
way in which the organisms implicitly responded to those samples. To test this hypothesis, 
Zentall, Urcuioli, and their associates conducted a series of experiments to obtain convergent 
evidence regarding the existence and nature of such common representation(s). 
Delayed matching tests. Evidence consistent with the development of common 
representations was obtained by comparing retention functions when a delay was inserted 
between the sample and comparison stimuli. Typically, hue-sample retention functions for 
pigeons are generally much shallower than line-sample retention functions (i.e., as the delay 
increases, matching accuracy is better maintained when the samples are hues) (Farthing, Wagner, 
Gilmour, & Waxman, 1977; Urcuioli et al., 1989; Wasserman, Bhatt, Chatlosh, & Kiedinger, 
1987; Zentall, Urcuioli, Jagielo, Jackson-Smith, 1989). However, the corresponding hue-sample 
and line-sample retention functions following MTO training are quite similar (i.e., they have 
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comparable slopes) (see Figure 2; Urcuioli et al., 1989, Experiment 1; Zentall et al., 1989), a 
result consistent with the hypothesis that samples associated with a common comparison 
stimulus are commonly represented. 
Interference/facilitation effects. Another source of converging evidence for the 
establishment of associative classes following MTO matching training was reported by Zentall, 
Sherburne, and Urcuioli (1993; see also Lippa & Goldstone, 2001). Zentall et al. (1993) initially 
trained pigeons on MTO matching with hue and line samples after which two of the samples (the 
hues) from original training were associated with new comparison stimuli (cf. Table 1, Interim 
Training). Later, delays were inserted between the samples and comparisons on each trial, and 
training was continued until a high level of accuracy was achieved. On subsequent test trials, one 
or the other of the remaining samples from original training was presented during the retention 
interval, and accuracy was compared with that on control trials without a retention-interval 
stimulus (see Table 2). 
For pigeons that quickly acquired the more difficult line-sample matching associations 
during MTO training, test-trial accuracy increased when the interpolated stimulus was 
associatively similar to the sample on that trial (i.e., the interpolated stimulus had been 
associated with the same comparison as the sample in MTO training). Conversely, accuracy was 
disrupted when the interpolated stimulus was incompatible with the sample stimulus on that trial 
(i.e., the interpolated stimulus had been associated with a comparison which was different from 
the sample in MTO training). Thus, if one inserts into the delay a sample formerly associated 
with the same comparison stimulus as the current sample, then it facilitates delayed matching 
accuracy, whereas if one inserts into the delay a sample formerly associated with a different 
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comparison stimulus from the current sample, then it disrupts delayed matching accuracy. 
Sample discriminability tests. If stimuli which are inherently dissimilar (hues and lines) 
are commonly represented by being associated with a common comparison stimulus, then 
requiring an explicit discrimination between them should be relatively difficult (cf. Hall, 1996; 
Meeter, Shohany, & Myers, 2009). To test this prediction, Kaiser, Sherburne, Steirn, and Zentall 
(1997) trained pigeons on a simple successive discrimination involving the four samples from 
MTO matching (see Table 3). When the samples that had been associated with the same 
comparison were both followed by reinforcement or were both followed by the absence of 
reinforcement, acquisition of the successive discrimination was more rapid than the condition in 
which those samples signaled different reinforcement contingencies (viz., one was followed by 
reinforcement and the other was not; see Figure 3). These results, too, are consistent with the 
common representation hypothesis. 
Partial- versus total-reversal tests. Further evidence for an associative relation between 
samples occasioning the same comparison choice response comes from research involving 
partial versus total reversals (Zentall, Steirn, Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1991; cf. Table 4). If such 
samples are commonly represented, then subsequently reversing the sample-comparison relations 
for just one pair of samples (e.g., the lines) should yield relatively slow reacquisition. More 
specifically, such a partial reversal ought to be slower than if all four sample-comparison 
relations are reversed (a total reversal), even though the latter involves twice as many reversed 
relations. The rationale for this prediction is that only the total reversal permits the hypothesized 
common representations between samples associated with the same comparison to remain intact 
(i.e., red and vertical samples would still be associated with a common response, as would green 
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and horizontal samples). 
The results of this experiment indicated that pigeons took longer to relearn the line-
sample contingencies of the task when they alone were reversed than when they and the hue-
sample contingencies were also reversed (see Figure 4). Interestingly, the same was not true for 
the hue-sample reversal. For this group, there was no retardation of reversal learning produced 
by reversing only two of the four sample-comparison associations. This behavioral asymmetry 
has theoretical implications (that will be described later) for the nature of the common sample 
representation that results from MTO training. For now, it should be noted that this asymmetry 
rules out a less interesting alternative account: namely, that total reversals are learned faster than 
partial reversals because the change in contingencies for the total reversal is less discriminable 
vis-a-vis original training than the change in contingencies for the partial reversal. If 
discriminating the change in reinforcement contingencies were solely responsible for the partial- 
versus total-reversal effect, then one would expect comparable retardation for the hue-sample 
partial reversal group and the line-sample partial reversal group. 
The re-learning disadvantage of partial over total reversals can also be shown when 
training involves simple successive discriminations in which two stimuli (e.g., a red hue and a 
vertical line) are associated with reinforcement and two other stimuli (e.g., a green hue and a 
horizontal line) are associated with the absence of reinforcement. When the outcomes associated 
with only the line samples are reversed, acquisition of the reversal is slower than when the 
outcomes associated with hue samples are also reversed (Zentall et al., 1991, Exp. 2; see also 
Nakagawa, 1986). 
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Superordinate categorization. We earlier introduced superordinate categorization as an 
important form of associative category learning in humans. Research has now confirmed that 
animals too can categorize stimuli at the superordinate level (e.g., Lazareva et al., 2004; Roberts 
& Mazmanian, 1988; Wasserman, DeVolder, & Coppage, 1992; Vonk & McDonald, 2004). 
In one exemplary experiment, Wasserman et al. (1992) arranged for pigeons to acquire 
two arbitrary superordinate categories, each comprising two basic-level categories. These 
researchers found clear evidence that new categories of functionally equivalent stimuli could be 
learned, thereby supporting the view that much of the richness and complexity of human 
conceptual behavior can be found in the behavior of nonhuman and nonverbal animals. 
Specifically, Wasserman et al. (1992) devised a three-step experiment to determine whether 
pigeons could be encouraged to amalgamate two basic categories into one broader category that 
was not defined by any obvious perceptual features. In the first step of the experiment, by 
reinforcing responding to two different keys, pigeons were trained to sort slides into two arbitrary 
conjoint categories, such as the conjoint category of cars and people and the conjoint category of 
chairs and flowers (there were 12 exemplars in each of the four basic-level categories). In the second 
step of the experiment, the pigeons were trained to make a new response to only one stimulus class in 
each conjoint category. For example, some birds were trained to peck one new key when a car 
appeared and to peck another new key when a flower appeared. In the third step involving pecks to 
the two new keys, the pigeons were tested with slides from all four stimulus classes to see whether 
the conjoint categories that they had learned in the first step would influence their response to the 
stimulus classes that had been withheld in the second step (see Bhatt & Wasserman, 1989 for related 
research into the role of perceptual resemblance in similar reassignment training and testing). 
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Would the birds peck the new key to which cars had been reassigned when a person appeared? 
Would they peck the new key to which flowers had been reassigned when a chair appeared? 
The average score was 87% correct in the case of stimuli that had been reassigned and 72% 
in the case of stimuli that had not been reassigned. So, merely by being associated with a common 
response, perceptually disparate stimuli had amalgamated into a new conjoint category of 
functionally equivalent stimuli (see also Smeets, Barnes, & Roche, 1997). 
What is the Nature of the Common Representation? 
Behavior analysts avoid the use of cognitive terminology because they believe that such 
terminology is superfluous. If terms like common representation are mere stand ins to denote 
stimuli that are members of a stimulus class, then there is indeed no need for nor advantage to 
the use of such a term. On the other hand, if common representation is used to refer not only to 
stimuli within an associative class but to their potentially identifiable characteristics (e.g., like 
those proposed by Miller & Dollard, 1941), then there may be value in its usage. Of course, 
trying to identify the nature of those representations, especially in a nonverbal organism, is a 
challenging task. 
Nevertheless, one can hypothesize about possible candidates and devise experimental 
tests based on those hypotheses (Meeter et al., 2009). For example, if two stimuli, A and B, are 
each associated with a common reinforced comparison stimulus, C, then one possible common 
representation is a prospective representation of Stimulus C. Stated otherwise, seeing either A or 
B might activate implicit or explicit anticipatory responses of C (e.g., Grant, 1982; Honig & 
Thompson, 1982; Hull, 1939). It is also possible that presentation of one of the samples, say 
Stimulus A, activates a representation of the other sample, Stimulus B, a transformed 
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retrospective representation of the original stimulus. 
The prospective representation hypothesis. Urcuioli (1996) proposed that a common 
prospective representation in the form of implicit mediating responses or response intentions (see 
also Honig & Wasserman, 1981) can account for the transfer of training results reported by 
Urcuioli et al. (1989) According to Urcuioli’s model (see Table 5), after the MTO contingencies 
have been learned, presentation of either the red or vertical-line samples evokes the anticipatory 
representation of their associated correct comparison stimulus (e.g., circle), and likewise for the 
presentation of the green and horizontal-lines samples. During interim training, each sample 
stimulus (e.g., red) and the anticipatory representation of the comparison (e.g., the circle) it 
continues to evoke (because of continual refresher training on MTO matching) become 
conditional cues for reinforced responding to a new comparison stimulus (e.g., blue). Finally, on 
test trials, presentation of the vertical-line sample is able to selectively cue a blue-comparison 
choice via the link established between the anticipatory (circle) representation and blue during 
interim training. In other words, the anticipatory representations presumably mediate the 
generalization of the new comparison responses explicitly learned to the samples in interim 
training to the remaining, “untrained” samples from MTO matching, resulting in the emergent 
relations observed in testing (also see Wasserman et al., 1992). 
The prospective hypothesis receives support from the finding that the transfer observed 
after MTO and interim training is not observed if pigeons learn the identical sets of conditional 
relations prior to training (see Table 6), but organized such that initial training involves one-to-
many (OTM) or “sample-as-node” matching (Urcuioli, Zentall, & DeMarse, 1995; see also 
Urcuioli & Zentall, 1993). In OTM matching, each sample occasions two different reinforced 
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comparison responses (albeit on separate trials). As shown in Table 6, prospective comparison 
representations cannot mediate the association between the samples that were first experienced in 
Interim Training and the comparison stimuli that were experienced in Original Training, but not 
in Interim Training. In sum, different comparison stimuli associated with the same sample 
stimuli are generally not interchangeable with one another (although see the results of Pigeons 
CG5 and IN1 in Urcuioli et al., 1995 as possible exceptions.) 
Interestingly, the absence of interchangeability between “target” stimuli associated with a 
common antecedent stimulus may be restricted to conditional choice procedures in animals. For 
example, using rats, Sawa and Nakajima (2002) found that, after OTM training in which a 
common antecedent flavor preceded (on separate trials) two different target flavors, conditioning 
a taste aversion to one target transferred to the other target. Similar findings have been reported 
in CER conditioning with rats by Johns and Williams (1998) as well as Hall, Ray and Bonardi 
(1993) and in pigeon autoshaping by Bonardi, Rey, Richmond, and Hall (1993). Interestingly, 
Hall et al. (1993) offered a frustration-based mediational interpretation of their transfer findings. 
In any event, Urcuioli and Lionello-DeNolf (2001) obtained results indicating that 
anticipatory mediated generalization (prospective representation) is not necessary to observe the 
transfer effects following MTO training. They compared test results from two groups of pigeons. 
One group was trained in the fashion depicted in Table 5 (viz., MTO training followed by 
interim, two-sample/two-comparison training). A second group, however, was trained on MTO 
matching after acquiring the two-sample/two-comparison “interim” task. In testing, both groups 
showed comparable levels of transfer performance when they were required to match the 
remaining samples from MTO matching to the comparisons appearing in the two-sample/two-
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comparison task. Apparently, then, from a representational viewpoint, other forms of “common 
coding” (see below) can yield transfer-of-control effects. 
The retrospective representation hypothesis. Although Urcuioli’s (1996) model of 
mediated generalization was based on prospective representations of the comparison stimuli 
and/or responses, the only representational requirement needed to account for the emergent 
relations observed after MTO training is that the mediator be common to both samples (cf. 
Urcuioli & Lionello-DeNolf, 2001, Table 4). An alternative to the prospective representation 
hypothesis for which there is supportive evidence is the retrospective representation of one of the 
samples (Zentall, Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1995; see also Urcuioli & Zentall, 1986). 
Such a common retrospective mediator might take the following form (see Table 7): 
During MTO training, red and vertical samples, for example, would both be represented as ‘red,’ 
and green and horizontal samples would both be represented as ‘green.’ During subsequent 
interim training, the red and green samples, coded as ‘red’ and ‘green,’ respectively, would now 
be associated with new comparisons. Finally, on test trials, the vertical samples coded as ‘red’ 
and the horizontal sample coded as ‘green’ should (and do) now occasion the same new 
comparison responses that were explicitly associated with red and green during interim training. 
Evidence for the retrospective representation of samples following MTO training comes 
from two sources. First, as mentioned earlier, evidence for the superiority of total versus partial 
reversals reported by Zentall et al. (1991) was found for the partial-reversal group in which only 
the line-orientation-sample associations were reversed, but not for the other partial reversal 
group in which only the hue-sample associations were reversed. These data are consistent with 
the hypothesis that the common retrospective mediators are representations of the hues because, 
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for both the partial-reversal hues group and the total reversal group, the associations between the 
hue mediators and the comparison stimuli would have to be reversed but the original mediators 
would remain functional. For the partial-reversal line group, however, new mediators would 
have to be established (the old mediators would still be functional for the maintained hue sample 
associations). 
This account makes an interesting prediction. On the one hand, the unchanged hue 
sample-comparison associations for the partial-reversal lines group should experience very little 
disruption (as already noted). However, the unchanged line sample-comparison associations for 
the partial-reversal hues group should experience considerable disruption because, for this group, 
as the associations between the hue mediators and the comparison stimulus encounter the 
reversal contingencies, they should no longer be functional for the line samples and new 
mediators would therefore need to develop. 
Which sample dimension serves as the basis for the common representation following 
MTO training may depend on which samples are more salient (cf. Carter & Eckerman, 1975) or 
which of the sample-comparison associations are acquired first. For example, if the hue-sample 
associations are acquired first, then the association of the remaining samples (i.e., line 
orientations) with those same comparisons may be facilitated if they too are represented as hues.  
In support of this hypothesis, Zentall et al. (1993) found that overall fast learners acquired the 
hue-sample associations at about the same rate as overall slow learners, but they acquired the 
line-orientation-sample associations significantly faster than did the slow learners. If the fast 
learners represented the line orientations as hues, then this analysis could account for both the 
absence of faster acquisition of the hue-sample associations and the faster acquisition of line-
Associative Concept Learning    25 
 
orientation-sample associations. 
More compelling evidence for retrospective representations comes from research 
involving conditional discriminations with samples of food and the absence of food (viz., “no 
food”). As noted earlier, food and no-food samples (or, for that matter, any sample dimension 
defined by the presence vs. absence of an event) typically yield divergent retention functions 
(Colwill, 1984; Grant, 1991; Sherburne & Zentall, 1993; Wilson & Boakes, 1985). Specifically, 
the no-food retention function is virtually flat, whereas the food-sample retention function shows 
the typical decrement in accuracy with increasing delay intervals. 
By contrast, retention functions obtained following training with just hue or line-
orientation samples are generally parallel for the two samples from each dimension. Thus, if one 
trains pigeons on MTO matching in which food and no-food samples occasion the same 
comparison choices as red and green hue samples, respectively, the slopes of the resulting 
retention functions can be used to infer the nature of the underlying representations. For 
example, if such training yielded parallel food versus no-food-sample retention functions, then 
this result would suggest that these samples were represented as red or green hues. Conversely, if 
the hue-sample retention functions diverge, then this result would suggest that the hues were 
represented as food or no food. 
Zentall et al. (1995) found that following MTO training with red/green and food/no-food 
samples, the retention functions diverged not only for the food/no-food samples, but for the 
red/green samples as well. Importantly, a flat function was observed for the hue sample that 
occasioned the same comparison choice as the no-food sample, whereas a decremental function 
was observed for the hue sample that occasioned the same comparison choice as the food sample 
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(see Figure 5); this outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that samples associated with the 
same comparison are commonly represented. 
Similar results were reported by Urcuioli, DeMarse, and Zentall (1994) after training 
pigeons on MTO matching with three pairs of samples (food vs. no-food, 20 pecks vs. 1 peck, 
and red vs. green) mapped onto one pair of comparison stimuli (blue and white). Typically, when 
delays are introduced between the samples and the comparison stimuli, differential sample 
pecking, as well as food versus no-food samples, result in divergent retention functions 
following one-to-one matching training (cf. Fetterman & MacEwen, 1989), but not following red 
versus green samples. However, following MTO training with the three sets of samples, the 
retention functions for red versus green sample trials resembled those on the food versus no-food 
and 20-peck versus 1-peck sample trials. Specifically, the function for the green sample, that 
occasioned the same comparison choice as the no-food sample and the 1-peck sample, was 
relatively flat, whereas the function for the red sample, that occasioned the same comparison 
choice as the food sample and the 20-pecks sample, was relatively steep. This pattern of results 
suggests that red and green had been represented in a fashion similar to those of the other pairs of 
samples – viz., in terms of presence versus absence. This retrospective representation account 
certainly fits the observed pattern of findings much better that an unembellished prospective 
account, which predicts parallel retention functions for the two samples within each sample 
dimension. These data underscore the benefits of adopting a representational viewpoint, without 
which these data would be difficult to explain. 
Other Procedures for Creating Associative Classes 
Common reinforcement history. An especially interesting case of the common 
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representation of arbitrary stimuli was first reported by Vaughan (1988). In his research, the 
defining characteristic of each of two stimulus classes was whether responding to the members 
of each class (viz., stimuli which were randomly placed into each of two sets) was reinforced or 
nonreinforced; this characteristic was repeatedly reversed across blocks of sessions as soon as 
pigeons met a predetermined discrimination criterion. Because the overall reinforcement value of 
each set was the essentially the same over sessions (i.e., the stimuli in each set served equally 
often as “positive” or S+ stimuli and as “negative” or S stimuli), the only feature that could be 
used to distinguish between the sets was the reinforcement conditions that were constant within a 
training session. 
Vaughan first randomly assigned photographs of trees to two arbitrary sets: A and B. 
After pigeons had learned that responses to stimuli in Set A were reinforced and that responses to 
stimuli in Set B were not, the valence associated with each set was reversed until reacquisition 
reached high levels of discriminative performance, and then reversed again, etc. After a large 
number of such reversals, Vaughan found that early in a session (i.e., after a small number of 
stimuli from each set had been presented), pigeons would respond appropriately to the remaining 
members of each set. These data imply the formation of contingency-based associative classes, 
given that once the current status of a member or members of a set was determined in a session, 
animals then responded appropriately to the remaining members of the set, despite not yet having 
experienced the reversed contingencies for those members in that session and despite the fact 
that they shared no more in common (in terms of physical similarity and overall reinforcement 
histories) than they did with members of the other class (although see Hayes, 1989, for an 
alternative account). 
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Jitsumori and her colleagues later deployed Vaughan’s reversal design in an innovative 
series of experiments with pigeons further investigating a variety of issues in associative class 
formation, including the role of perceptual resemblance (Delius, Jitsumori, & Siemann, 2000; 
Jitsumori, Shimada, & Inoue, 2006; Jitsumori, Siemann, Lehr, & Delius, 2002). Further follow-
up findings have been reported for dolphins by von Fersen and Delius (2000) and for a 
chimpanzee by Tomonaga (1999). 
Symmetry training. Having two stimuli associated with the same comparison or outcome 
may not be the only procedure that can produce acquired equivalence. Zentall, Clement, and 
Weaver (2003) asked if bidirectional training (A→B and B→A) will make those stimuli 
functionally equivalent. The rationale for this procedure was that if directionality plays an 
important part in the nature of an association (e.g., A always followed by B, or A was always 
first and B was always second), then perhaps training the association in both directions might 
eliminate its directionality component and yield an associative class which contains the two 
nominal stimuli (see also Schusterman & Kastak, 1993). 
In symmetry training, subjects learn that when Stimulus A appears first, it is always 
followed by Stimulus B and when Stimulus B appears first, it is always followed by Stimulus A. 
If this procedure effectively establishes an acquired equivalence between A and B, then one 
should be able to train a new association between one of those stimuli (e.g., A) with new 
Stimulus C and then show that an emergent relation has developed between the remaining 
stimulus (i.e., B) and new Stimulus C. The design of this experiment appears in Table 8. Zentall 
et al. (2003) found that such training produced significant transfer to a new association (61.2%) 
when one of those symmetry-trained stimuli was associated with a new stimulus in a matching-
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to-sample task and the remaining symmetry-trained stimulus then replaced the first (see also, 
Yamamoto & Asano, 1995). 
Associative symmetry1 and stimulus equivalence. Associative concept learning also aptly 
describes the findings of an extensive program of research on stimulus equivalence that began 
with a now classic experiment by Sidman (1971). He trained a severely disabled child with 
limited verbal ability to select the appropriate picture (B) of an object upon hearing the spoken 
word (A) for that object (A→B) and to select the appropriate written word (C) for an object upon 
hearing the spoken word for the object (A→C). Sidman then found that these two explicitly 
trained relations yielded a new (untrained) relation C→B: The child was now able select the 
picture of an object when presented with the written word for that object. In other words, training 
resulted in [A, B, C] classes consisting of objects, the spoken words for those objects, and the 
written word for the objects. 
Sidman and Tailby (1982) formalized the notion of stimulus equivalence in behavior 
based upon the mathematical (set theory) definition of an equivalence relation. Specifically, an 
equivalence relation among Stimuli A, B, and C is established by demonstrating three emergent 
behavioral effects following training: (1) Reflexivity = matching each stimulus to itself (typically 
inferred from a participant’s ability to exhibit generalized identity matching), (2) Symmetry = 
following training to select Comparison B after being presented with Sample A, participants will 
now select Comparison A after being presented with Sample B, and (3) Transitivity = following 
training to select Comparison B after being presented with Sample A and to select Comparison C 
after being presented with Sample B, subjects will now select Comparison C after being 
presented with Sample A. 
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For the present purposes, we wish to emphasize three points. First, “The study of 
equivalence relations…leads directly into matters of classification, representation, and reference 
(Sidman, 2008, p. 323).” Second, the transfer (emergent) performances that are observed in 
equivalence relations tests also demonstrate the power of common associations (e.g., in A→B 
and B→C training or in A→B and A→C training) in yielding associative concepts, despite 
lingering questions about the necessity or value of representational or mediational accounts of 
such transfer (e.g., Sidman, 1994, pp. 110-117; Sidman, Cresson, & Willson-Morris, 1974). 
Third, and perhaps most importantly: “Symmetry precepts are always involved with 
categorization, with classification (Wade, 2006, p. 1).” 
Not surprisingly, then, the “search for symmetry” in nonhuman animals (Lionello-
DeNolf, 2009; Lionello-DeNolf & Urcuioli, 2002; Sidman et al., 1982) has long occupied the 
attention of researchers interested in animal conceptual behavior and, until recently, has been an 
especially elusive phenomenon (although see Schusterman & Kastak, 2003; Yamamoto & 
Asano, 1995). 
A large part of the reason for this elusiveness has been the misidentification of the 
effective or functional stimulus for the animal, something which does not necessarily correspond 
to the experimenter’s definition (McIlvane et al., 2000). For instance, for pigeons and monkeys, 
where a stimulus appears (viz., its spatial location) is an important component of the functional 
stimulus (Iversen et al. 1986, Lionello & Urcuioli, 1998). Consequently, when the samples and 
comparisons of an arbitrary (A→B) matching task switch locations during a symmetry test  
(B→A), the animal essentially encounters novel stimuli: In other words, B on the center key (as 
a sample) is not the same stimulus, despite appearances to us, as B on the side key (as a 
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comparison). Similarly, when a stimulus appears within a trial is also important (cf. Zentall, 
1996), as indicated by other findings in both the Pavlovian and operant conditioning literatures 
(e.g., Balsam & Gallistel, 2008; D’Amato & Colombo, 1988; Honig, 1981; Miller & Barnet, 
1993; Terrace, 1986). 
 These considerations are germane to recent successful demonstrations of symmetry in 
pigeons (Frank & Wasserman, 2005a; Urcuioli, 2008a, Experiment 3) using successive or go/no-
go matching to sample (Wasserman, 1976; see also Konorski, 1957). In successive matching, 
only one comparison is presented after the sample on each trial and that comparison appears at 
the same location as the preceding sample. This procedure avoids any changes in stimulus 
location when shifting from training to testing and it also ensures the same requisite (viz., 
successive) discriminations between samples and between comparisons (cf. Saunders & Green, 
1999). The task involves reinforcing responding to one comparison after one sample but not after 
the other, and vice versa for responding to the alternative comparison. Each comparison is 
presented for an extended period of time (e.g., 5 or 10 sec) so that the rate of responding to it can 
be assessed, and one main measure of discriminative performance is the difference in the rate of 
responding to the comparisons on reinforced trials versus nonreinforced trials. 
 Frank and Wasserman (2005a) and Urcuioli (2008a, Experiment 3) concurrently trained 
pigeons on arbitrary (A→B) successive matching and on two identity successive matching tasks 
involving the stimuli appearing in the arbitrary task (viz., A→A and B→B matching). Thus, not 
only did this training ensure that each nominal stimulus was seen both as a sample and as a 
comparison prior to symmetry (B→A) testing, but it arranged for common associations among 
the various matching stimuli (cf. Frank, 2007). Specifically, the A and B comparisons were both 
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associated with the A samples (viz., via A→B and A→A training) and the A and B samples were 
both associated with the B comparisons (viz., via A→B and B→B training). The net result (see 
Figure 6) was that on subsequent, nonreinforced symmetry probe trials (B→A), pigeons 
responded more frequently to the comparisons on probes that were the reverse of the reinforced 
baseline (A→B) relations than to the comparisons on probes that were the reverse of the 
nonreinforced baseline (A→B) relations. In other words, new relations had emerged from the 
explicitly trained (baseline) relations. Interestingly, these demonstrations of associative 
symmetry in pigeons appear to directly contradict Relational Frame Theory, given its assertion 
that a history of such arbitrary applicable relational responding (in this case, of “mutual 
entailment”) is necessary to observe emergent symmetrical responding (e.g., Barnes, 1994). 
Mutual entailment means that “A related to B” necessitates (“entails”) that “B is related to A”, 
symmetry being one (albeit not the only) example of it.  According to Relational Frame Theory, 
prior reinforced experience with different examples of symmetrical relations is required in order 
to observe emergent symmetry.  Clearly, in our demonstrations, there was no such history. 
 Urcuioli (2008a) has proposed a theory of pigeons’ stimulus-class formation to explain 
these results and to successfully predict other emergent stimulus control effects (e.g., Urcuioli, 
2008a, Experiment 4; Sweeney & Urcuioli, 2010). Although non-mediational in nature, the 
theory nonetheless derives its predictive power from the idea that common sample and 
comparison associations generate classes that contain the elements necessary for the emergence 
of symmetry and other derived stimulus relations. In other words, those common associations 
yield associative concepts or classes whose elements are stimuli that are hypothesized to consist 
of the nominal stimulus itself (e.g., red), when it appears in a matching trial (viz., first as a 
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sample or second as a comparison), and where it appears (e.g., on the center key – cf. Swisher & 
Urcuioli, 2013). 
Conclusions 
The experiments described in this review suggest that MTO matching and related 
procedures result in the development of emergent relations between samples associated with a 
common comparison that can be described as acquired equivalence or associative concepts. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of these associative concepts comes from the results of 
transfer of training procedures in which, following many-to-one matching and the reassignment 
of some of the original samples to new comparisons, emergent relations can be shown to have 
developed between the remaining samples and the new comparison stimuli. These emergent 
relations direct the organism to correct comparison alternatives that have never before been 
given in the presence of the remaining sample stimuli. Further research has indicated that the 
nature of the associative concept is likely to be a common representation of the different sample 
stimuli that were associated with the same comparison stimulus. Learned stimulus equivalences 
of this sort would appear to be foundational to what cognitive psychologists have termed 
superordinate concepts. 
There is also evidence that acquired equivalence is not unique to the MTO matching 
procedure. It has also been found following symmetry training and following Vaughan’s (1988) 
multiple-reversal procedure. Thus, the development of associative classes is a robust and general 
phenomenon in the nonhuman animal literature. 
Formal equivalence – a special case of emergent stimulus relations involving reflexivity, 
symmetry, and transitivity – appears to have been difficult to demonstrate in pigeons; however, 
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this failure may result from the fact that a stimulus that appears as a sample need not be the same 
as a stimulus that appears as a comparison, either in its spatial or in its temporal location. Once 
that fact is taken into account, good evidence for symmetry can readily be demonstrated. 
The defining feature of an associative class is that members of such a class are related 
arbitrarily (e.g., an object and its various symbolic representations) and membership must be 
acquired through training. This feature provides associative classes with a flexibility that makes 
them suitable for use with human language. The great advantage that associative classes provide 
is that once an associative class has been formed, if a new response is learned to one member of 
the class, then that new response should generalize to the other members of that class. The 
research with animals suggests that the ability to form associative classes is not unique to 
humans. Thus, these building blocks of language, arguably one of the abilities that distinguishes 
humans from other animals (at least quantitatively), is well developed in other animals too. 
Coda 
We began our consideration of different kinds of concepts by discussing perceptual 
concepts. Such concepts are not arbitrary or contrived for convenience, but real. To use Plato’s 
famous words, they “cut nature at its joints.” Critically, Quine (1969) believed similarity to be 
the bedrock of perceptual concepts. According to Quine, both humans and animals possess an 
innate standard of similarity; he further asserted that standard to be absolutely animal in its lack 
of intellectual status. This analysis suggests that, although both humans and animals might form 
and use perceptual concepts, perhaps only humans might form and use associative concepts, 
where something more intellectually advanced that mere similarity must come into play. 
The research that we have reviewed here argues against that human-animal distinction: 
animals can indeed acquire and adaptively deploy associative concepts. If we theorize that 
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humans contrive such concepts for functional convenience, then there is no reason to believe that 
the associative mechanisms that permit such adaptive conceptualization are not shared by 
animals as well. Fully understanding and appreciating the role of associative concepts in 
behavior will require a comparative understanding of their participation in the adaptive actions of 
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Table 1  
Many-to-One Transfer Design (after Urcuioli, Zentall, Jackson-Smith, & Steirn, 1989). 
                             
Original Training     Interim Training        Test                                                                                         
       R → V          R → C 
        G → H          G → D 
        V → V                     V → C 
        H → H          H → D  
Note. R = red, G = green, V = three vertical white lines, H = three horizontal white lines, C = a 
white line-drawn circle, D = a white dot. All lines and shapes were projected on a black 
background. For each trial type, the first letter represents the sample and the second the correct 
comparison. In Test, samples from Original Training that were not presented in Interim training 
were presented with the comparisons from Interim Training. 
  




Many-to-one Transfer Design; Interference/Facilitation (after Zentall, Sherburne, & Urcuioli 
1993). 
Original Training   Interim Training   Delay Training                        Test                                                                                         
       R → V   R → C     R——C         R--------C      R—V—C       R—H—C 
      G → H                   G → D     G——D              G--------D      G—H—D      G—V—D 
      V → V        
      H → H            
                      
  
Note. R = red, G = green, V = three vertical white lines, H = three horizontal white lines, C = a 
white line-drawn circle, D = a white dot. All lines and shapes were projected on a black 
background. For each trial type, the first letter represents the sample and the second the correct 
comparison. In test, samples from Phase 1 that were not presented in Phase 2 were presented 
with the comparisons from Phase 2 and reinforced responding was either consistent with or 
inconsistent with the presumed common representations. 
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Table 3 
 Sample Discriminability Design Following Many-to-One Matching (after Kaiser, Sherburne, 
Steirn, & Zentall. 1997). 
 
   Train                                                        Transfer          
     Consistent              Inconsistent 
             R → C           R+          R+ 
             G → D           G-          G- 
             V → C           V+           V- 
H → D           H-           H+ 
                                                                                                          .   
 Note. R = red, G = green, V = three vertical black lines, H = three horizontal   
 black lines, C = a line-drawn circle, D = a 2mm dot. All lines and shapes were projected 
 on a black background. For each trial type the first letter represents the sample and the 
 second the correct comparison. The transfer test for Group Consistent consisted of simple 
 successive discrimination in which the samples presumed to represent one stimulus class 
 were discriminated from the samples presumed to represent the other stimulus class. The 
 transfer test for Group Inconsistent consisted of a similar simple successive
 discrimination but one sample from each presumed stimulus class had to be discriminated 
 from the other sample in its presumed class. 
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Table 4 
Many-to-One Partial Versus Total Reversal (after Zentall, Sherburne, Steirn, Randall, Roper, & 
Urcuioli, 1992). 
                             
        Original Training                                             Reversal                              
          Partial Reversal       Total Reversal  
All Groups          Group Hue           Group Line          Group Hue-Line                                                                                                               
   R → C       R → D  R → C          R → D 
   G → D       G → C  G → D         G → C 
   V → C       V → C  V → D         V → D 
   H → D       H → D  H → C          H → C   
                                                                                                               
Note. The first letter of each pair represents the sample (R = red, G = green, V = vertical, H = 
horizontal) and the second letter represents the correct comparison (C = circle, D = dot).
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Table 5 
A Prospective Mediated Generalization Account of Common Representation Effects in Many-to-
One Matching. 
                                                                                                
           Training                   Testing  
         Original Training        Interim Training            
 R -“c” → C +  R -“c”=> B+   
 G -“d” → D +  G -“d”=> W+   
 V -“c” → C+     V -“c”=> B+ 
            H -“d” → D+     H -“d”=> W+ 
                                                                                                          . 
Note. R = red, G = green, V = vertical lines, H = horizontal lines, C = circle, D = dot. “c” and “d” 
represent circle and dot mediating responses, respectively, to the samples (R, G, V & H). → 
represents associations formed during Original Training. => represents associations formed 
during Interim Training. Thus, in Testing, V and H will elicit mediating responses “c” and “d” 
and transfer of training should result. 
 
  




A Prospective Mediated Generalization Account of the Failure to Find Transfer of Training with 
One-to-Many Matching. 
                                                                                                
            Training                   Testing  
____Original Training        Interim Training             
 
 R -“c” → C +           V -“c” => C+   
 G -“d” → D +           H -“d” => D+   
 R -“b” → B+              V -“c”=> (B+) 
 G -“w” → W+            H –“d”=> (W+)  
                                                                                                          . 
Note. R = red, G = green, V = vertical lines, H = horizontal lines, C = circle, D = dot. “r”, “g”, 
“v”, and “h” represent red, green, vertical, and horizontal mediating responses, respectively, to 
the samples (C and D). Dashes (-) represent associations formed during Phase 1. Double dashes 
(=) represent associations formed during Phase 2. Dashes (-) represent associations formed 
during Phase 1. Double dashes (=) represent associations formed during Phase 2. Stimuli in 
parentheses represent the actual comparison stimuli in Phase 3. Thus, in Testing, B and W will 
elicit mediating responses “r” and “g” rather than “v” and “h” and transfer of training should not 
result. 
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Table 7 
A Retrospective Mediated Generalization Account of Common Representation Effects in Many-
to-One Matching. 
                                                                                                
            Training                   Testing  
____Original Training        Interim Training             
 
 R -“r” → C +  R -“r”=> B+   
 G -“g” → D +  G -“g”=> W+   
 V -“r” → C+     V -“r”=> B+ 
 H -“g” → D+     H -“g”=> W+ 
 
Note. R = red, G = green, V = vertical lines, H = horizontal lines, C = circle, D = dot. “r”, “g”, 
represent red and green mediating responses, respectively, to the samples (R and G, and V and 
H). “→” represents associations formed during original training. => represents associations 
formed during interim training. Thus, in testing, V and H will elicit mediating responses “r” and 
“g” and transfer of training should result. 
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Table 8 
Design of Symmetry Training Experiment (after Zentall, Clement, & Weaver, 2003) 
              
   Training              Testing   
  Successive Presentations    Matching-to-Sample   Matching-to-Sample       
Red – Circle  Circle – Red    Circle → Yellow (Blue)  Red → Yellow (Blue)    
Green – Plus Plus – Green    Plus → Blue (Yellow)  Green → Blue (Yellow)  
Note - All successive presentations were followed by food. For matching-to-sample the first 
stimulus represents the sample, the second stimulus the correct comparison. The incorrect 
comparison is presented in parentheses. All stimuli were counterbalanced. 
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1The meaning of the term “associative symmetry” and the term “symmetry” in the 
stimulus equivalence literature is the same, and we use them interchangeable. In one important 
respect, the term “associative symmetry” is preferable because it refers to an emergent relation 
derived from associative learning processes (cf. Asch & Ebenholtz, 1962). The term 
“symmetry,” on the other hand, can also refer to perceptual effects (e.g., mirror-image or 
bilateral symmetry). 
Associative Concept Learning    64 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Transfer of training for individual pigeons demonstrating the class consistent 
responding developed during many-to-one training (adapted from Urcuioli, Zentall, Jackson-
Smith, & Steirn, 1989). 
Figure 2. Retention functions following matching training in which hue samples and line-
orientation samples were associated with different comparisons (one-to-one matching) or 
common comparisons (many-to-one matching ) (adapted from Zentall, Urcuioli, Jagielo, & 
Jackson-Smith, 1989). 
Figure 3. Following many-to-one matching training pigeons were transferred to a successive 
discrimination in which responding to samples associated with the same comparison stimulus 
during training were either both reinforced or not reinforced (consistent) or responding to one 
sample was reinforced but not the other (inconsistent) (adapted from Kaiser, Sherburne, Steirn, 
& Zentall. 1997). 
Figure 4. Following many-to-one matching training, sample-comparison associations were 
reversed for only the hue samples, only the line samples, or for all of the samples (adapted from 
Zentall, Sherburne, Steirn, Randall, Roper, & Urcuioli, 1992).  
Figure 5. Retention functions following many-to-one matching training in which red and food 
samples were associated with choice of a vertical-line comparison and green and no-food 
samples were associated with choice of a horizontal-line comparison (adapted from Zentall, 
Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1995). 
Figure 6.    Comparison-response rates (in pecks/sec) on arbitrary matching baseline (Training) 
trials and on non-reinforced symmetry (Probe) trials during the first two test sessions following 
successive matching training involving hue samples and form comparisons (arbitrary matching) 
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and hue and form identity training.   Data are from two pigeons (EXT2 and EXT7) run in 
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